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A more accurate determination for the Probability of Failure on Demand 
(PFD) of the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) contributes to more SIS 
realiability, thereby ensuring more safety and lower cost. IEC 61508 and 
ISA TR.84.02 provide the PFD detemination formulas. However, these 
formulas suffer from an uncertaity issue due to the inclusion of uncertainty 
sources, which, including high redundant systems architectures, cannot be 
assessed, have perfect proof test assumption, and are neglegted in partial 
stroke testing (PST) of impact on the system PFD. On the other hand, de-
termining the values of PFD variables to achieve the target risk reduction 
involves daunting efforts and consumes time. This paper proposes a new 
approach for system PFD determination and PFD variables optimization 
that contributes to reduce the uncertainty problem. A higher redundant sys-
tem can be assessed by generalizing the PFD formula into KooN architec-
ture without neglecting the diagnostic coverage factor (DC) and common 
cause failures (CCF). In order to simulate the proof test effectiveness, the 
Proof Test Coverage (PTC) factor has been incorporated into the formula. 
Additionally, the system PFD value has been improved by incorporating 
PST for the final control element into the formula. The new developed 
formula is modelled using the Genetic Algorithm (GA) artificial technique. 
The GA model saves time and effort to examine system PFD and estimate 
near optimal values for PFD variables. The proposed model has been appli-
cated on SIS design for crude oil test separator using MATLAB. The com-
parison between the proposed model and PFD formulas provided by IEC 
61508 and ISA TR.84.02 showed that the proposed GA model can assess 
any system structure and simulate industrial reality. Furthermore, the cost 
and associated implementation testing activities are reduced.
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1. Introduction
Standards and regulations began being issued fol-lowing catastrophic industrial accidents that oc-curred during the second half of the last century. 
The target of these standards and regulations has been to 
obtain safeguarding methods for the prevention and mit-
igation of risks associated with the industrial process. In 
1974, 28 people died and 36 were injured in Flixborough, 
UK.
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[1]. In 1976, 17000 people were affected by dioxin 
release, 200 were poisoned, and 600 were evacuated [2]. 
In 1987, 167 people died in Piper Alpha, UK [3]. Conse-
quently, the standards IEC 61508 [4], IEC 615011 [5], and 
ISA-TR.84.00.02 [6] were issued, which are considered the 
most recent and widely accepted standards. Moreover, SIS 
is defined as a protection layer in the mentioned standards, 
which contributes to reduce the risk posed by industries 
including potential hazards such as those in the oil and gas 
industry.
Figure 1. Flow chart shows SIS contribution to risk re-
duction
The function of SIS is to continuously monitor the pro-
cess parameters, and in case any abnormal deviation oc-
curs, it performs a predetermined action to return the pro-
cess to its safe state. As shown in Figure 1, the SIS layer 
is considered as one of the most critical protection layers 
due to its ability to reduce the overall risk. Moreover, SIS 
consists of several safety-instrumented functions (SIFs). 
Each SIF consists of various subsystems (Sensor, Final 
Control Element, and Logic solver). Each SIF protects 
against an identified hazard and contributes to reduce the 
overall risk by a risk reduction Factor (RRF) or its inverse 
probability of failure on demand (PFD). Further, RRF 
identifies SIF associated safety integrity level (SIL).
The standards [4,5] provide a framework for establishing 
the overall requirements and technical activities related to 
the safety life cycle of SIS. As shown in Figure 2, the safety 
life cycle consists of three phases (analysis, realization, and 
operation), each of which consists of several steps. This 
paper is concerned with the PFD formula used for the SIS 
verification step included in the realization phase.
Phase 1
(Analysis)
Phase 2
(Realization)
Phase 3
Operation
Hazards and risk Assessment
Target Risk Reduction Factor RRF estimation
Safety requirement Specifications
Determination
SIS Design
PFD (1/RRF) determination
Installation and Test
SIS Start-up, Operation and Maintenance
Decommissioning
PFD Analytical formulas:
1. IEC 61508
2. ISA TR 84.02.00
Figure 2. Phases of safety Life Cycle
The conventional PFD determination formulas provided 
by IEC 61508 and ISA-TR.84.00.02 suffer from the uncer-
tainty problem as demonstrated in [7]. This problem is due 
to assumptions, approximation and limitation contamina-
tions. As an example of the formula limitations, only 1oo1, 
1oo2, 2oo2, 2oo3, and 2oo4 architectures can be examined. 
Therefore, there is no capability for a higher redundant sys-
tem structure examination [8]. Additionally, the failure rates 
(λ) are assumed as being constant. Another impractical as-
sumption is the perfectness of the proof test as it is assumed 
to reveal all undetected dangerous failures neglecting the 
effectiveness of the test procedures [9]. Further, the CCF data 
estimation methodology is based on the checklist questions, 
which involve operational, environmental, and human fac-
tors that may be difficult to be accurately answered [7]. How-
ever, parameters such as PST and online channel output 
comparison can reasonably improve the PFD value, which 
are not included in the formulas [10]. Finally, high efforts 
and significant time are consumed to examine the PFD and 
determine the values of design parameters (such as proof 
test interval, main repair time, and main time to restore, 
etc.). As a result, research contributed to identify, describe 
the uncertainty sources in conventional PFD formulas, and 
develop new formulas capable of minimizing the problem. 
As discussed in [7,11], the uncertainty sources in SIS PFD ex-
amination are completeness, model, and parameter sources. 
The authors identified and described the uncertainty sources 
and ranked the highest importance for completeness uncer-
tainty followed by parameter and model uncertainty. They 
stressed the uncertainty assessment importance during any 
SIS reliability examination and demonstrated that analysis 
results should include the performed uncertainty assess-
ment.
In [12], authors reduced one source of uncertainty by 
developing a new PFD formula considering non-constant 
failure rate through incorporating the degradation effect 
within different subsequent proof testing intervals, but the 
formula is limited to FCE, where PFD examination for-
mulas for LS and SE are not included.
In [10,13], authors reduced another source of uncertainty 
by deriving the PFD formula while incorporating PST. 
As they presented the impact of PST incorporation on 
PFD value, the derived formula in [10] can examine 1oo1 
architecture only and does not include other important 
variables influencing the PFD such as the β factors. 
A Koon generalized formula for PFD presented is in [14], 
where the PFD formula for different system architectures 
has been derived based on IEC 61508. 
Also, Authors in [15] proposed a generalized KooN for-
mula for PFD determination based on ISA TR84.00.02. 
Both formulas have the capability of examining the re-
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liability of SIS with high redundancy architecture. But 
the formula derived in [15] includes the contributions from 
DU failure, DD failures, DD and DU failures combina-
tion, and CCF for DU failure and DD failures with binary 
functions representing the independent failure coefficient 
or CCFs. The two proposed formulas assumed the perfect 
tests where the PTC factor was not included.
Another Generalized KooN formula presented in [16] 
considered whether or not the DD failures are repaired. 
The proposed equation counts for CCF for DU failure and 
DD failures, along with the perfect proof tests being as-
sumed. 
In [17], the classification of the non-perfect test and its 
effect on four IEC61508 formulas was discussed. Ac-
cordingly, two models from scientific papers and the PDS 
method in addition to the PTC impact were examined 
using the PTC factor, but the human error effect has not 
been deeply discussed. 
The practicality of perfect test assumption has been dis-
cussed in [18], which involved investigating the reasons of 
non-perfectness. The investigation resulted in five reasons 
known as the ‘five Ms’ (Method, Machine, Manpower, 
Milieu, and Material). 
Further, in [19,20], the authors discussed the non-perfect-
ness of the proof test, PTC determination, and the factors 
that may affect it; they demonstrated that perfect PTC 
assumption is not practical. In addition, different practical 
considerations can influence PTC. In [9], The authors pro-
posed procedures tables for PTC determination; that based 
on the test procedures.
The above-discussed researches have some merits and 
provided contributions. However, some drawbacks will be 
explained in more detail in Section 2. 
This paper introduces the optimization model for PFD 
determination using the GA artificial technique. The GA 
is a stochastic search technique that guides a population 
of solutions towards optimum values using the principles 
of evolution and natural genetics after searching a small 
portion of the search space [21]. Further, the GA model 
can accurately determine the PFD value and identify the 
best values for PFD variables in order to achieve the tar-
get RRF. Another credit for using GA is time and effort 
saving. In order to add the capability of higher redundant 
system examination, a generalized formula has been 
developed. Moreover, CCF and DD failures have been 
considered. The PTC factor has been incorporated into the 
formula to simulate the proof test effectiveness and the 
PFD value has been improved by incorporating PST for 
the final control element into the formula. The proposed 
model has been implemented on the SIS design for crude 
oil test separator using MATLAB. The model results were 
compared with conventional method results for interpreta-
tion.
The rest of this paper has been organized as follows:
Section 2 shows the problem areas of conventional 
PFD determination formulas through the formulas uncer-
tainty assessment.
Section 3 shows the development for the proposed 
model and implementation procedures. 
Section 4 explains the results for the practical case 
study where the proposed model is implemented.
Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 5.
2. Traditional PFD Determination Formulas 
and Main Contribution of the Paper
Conventional PFD determination formulas provided in 
IEC 61508 [4], ISA-TR.84.00.02 [6] and proposed alterna-
tives still need improvements as they suffer from limita-
tions and drawbacks, such as uncertainty contamination, 
that can affect SIS design. Further, uncertainty can be 
defined as something ‘not definitely ascertainable or fixed’ 
[11], which is caused by assumptions, approximations, 
limitations, lack of understanding, and time and effort 
consumptions [7]. Moreover, PFD cannot be perfectly 
described since the knowledge of its phenomena is not 
complete, so uncertainty can be reduced when knowledge 
about the system increases or when new technology such 
as Artificial Intelligence can be used.
In this section, the thoroughness of PFD conventional 
determination methods will be assessed through the un-
certainty assessment. Thus, the general sources for uncer-
tainty should be primarily be defined, followed by PFD 
formula uncertainity assessment being applied.
The general uncertainty sources are as follows:
(1) Model Uncertainty
(2) Parameter Uncertainty
(3) Completemness Uncertainty
Model Uncertainty: is due to simplification, assumption 
or approximation included in the model, which simulate 
the system or have different results for the same system 
when assessed using different models. Another concern is 
that reducing one uncertainty source may influence anoth-
er source.
Parameter Uncertainty: is usually, due to the probabi-
listic and non-probabilistic distributions for available data 
described the parameter values.
Completeness Uncertainty: is usually due to the inclu-
sion of assumptions, simplifications, and approximation; 
it can be known or unknown since each type has different 
causes. The cause of known completeness uncertainty 
is the non or improper inclusion for known factors that 
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have influenced the model due to difficulty of estimation, 
insufficient data availability or lack of understanding of 
the model. Therefore, it can be reduced by specific and 
conceptual incorporation for known factors that contribute 
to the model output; the cause of unknown completeness 
uncertainty are identified factors with marked contribution 
for their reduction through the expansion of the searching 
space, including the indirect factors that may impact the 
model or by incorporating new intelligent methods or al-
gorithms into the model.
Table 1 illustrates the uncertainty sources for conven-
tional PFD formulas.
Table1. Uncertainty assessment in the conventional PFD 
formula
1. Model 
Uncertainty
1.1 Formula Implementation Procedures.
1.2 Perfect Proof test assumption.
1.3 Different results obtained for the same system.
2. Parameter 
Uncertainty
2.1 Constant λD assumption.
2.2 Relative Unavailability of Failure rate data.
2.3 CCF estimation methodology.
3.Complete-
nessUncer-
tainty
3.1 Lack of system architectures inclusion.
3.2  Lack of testing and maintenance strategies’ effect on 
mission time inclusion.
3.3 Non-inclusion of human error variable.
3.4 Non-inclusion of the PST effect on the formula.
3.5  Channel output comparison limited to the 1oo2 struc-
ture (1oo2D).
From Table 1:
(1.1) Implementation procedures can increase the model 
complexity. Further, the complexity increases with com-
pleteness uncertainty reduction through incorporating new 
parameters, and parameter uncertainty may increase by the 
procedures of estimating the value of input parameters.
(1.2) Perfect proof test assumption does not simulate 
industrial reality, and the non-perfect proof test must be 
considered due to the effect of the implementation quality 
of the test procedures, errors committed by the mainte-
nance crew during the test, test equipment quality, and 
some inherent conditions for the tests. 
(1.3) Different results can be obtained for the same sys-
tem using different formulas, especially with high DC or 
long MRT.
(2.1) λD is a determination methodology usually deter-
mined from general data bases; such data bases are built 
based on the data from components that were installed 
several years before the data collection, and at different 
operational and environmental conditions. The collected 
failure rate data are based on recorded maintenance strate-
gies, which may not be accurately applied.
(2.2) Failure rate data for new technology devices are 
often not available.
(2.3) CCF estimation is based on checklist questions 
that involve operational, environmental, and human fac-
tors that may be difficult to be accurately answered. 
(3.1) The formulas are limited to 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 
2oo3, and 2oo4 (only the ISA formula) system architec-
tures where higher redundant architectures such as 3oo5 
cannot be examined. 
(3.2) Conventional formulas do not include the effect 
of testing and maintenance strategies on mission time of 
the subsystems.
(3.3) Conventional formulas do not include any vari-
able that simulates human error although human error is a 
well-known variable that may increase the probability of 
failure.
(3.4) PST is not included in the formula, although it 
can reasonably improve the PFD value.
(3.5) Channel output comparison is limited to the 1oo2 
structure named 1oo2D, while applying the online com-
parison between output channels can reasonably improve 
the DC factor as it can be applied for any system architec-
ture with redundancy.
Main contributions of this paper
This research contributes to reducing the uncertainty 
associated with the PFD detrmination citerion as described 
below:
Reference to point (1.1) in order to overcome the mod-
el complexity, GA will be used to model the formula in 
addition to widely decreasing the time and efforts required 
to determine the PFD value and the values of PFD vari-
ables. Moroever, it solves the problem of obtaining differ-
ent results for same system: point (1.3).
Reference to point (1.2) the proof test PTC factor (PTC) 
will be incorporated into the formula to simulate the ef-
fectiveness of the proof tests. 
Refrence to point (3.1) The newly developed formula 
will be genalized into the KooN system that can examine 
high redundant system architectures. 
Reference to point (3.4) The PST variable for the final 
cotrol element will be incorporated into the formula to 
simulate the effect of PST on system PFD value. 
Points (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (3.3) and 3.5 are out of this 
research scope and will be considered in the future work. 
3. Procedures of the Developed GA-based 
Optimization Model for the Probability of 
Failure on Demand
In order to overcome the drawbacks associated with con-
ventional PFD determination methods and to reduce the un-
certainty sources in the PFD formula discussed in Section 2, 
we must develop a new formula that can assess any KooN 
structure, incorporate all variables that can influence PFD, 
and finally model the formula using GA to find the optimal 
solutions for PFD variables as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Procedures of the developed GA optimization 
model for PFD
Step 1: Generalized the formula for KooN structure 
KooN expresses the system structure, where N is the 
number of channels/equipment sets, and K is the number 
needed to initiate the trip as it describes the connection 
between subsystem channels/equipment. 
The KooN system has  minimal cut sets of order (n - k 
+ 1); the average PFD of the kooN system is expressed as:
 (1)
The system structure is identified as per the fault toler-
ance requirement based on the following factors:
(1) The determined safety fractional factor 
[4]
(2) Device type (A or B)
(3) Determined target SIL
Step 2: Incorporating the DC factor into the formula.
Many dangerous failures of modern safety devices may 
be revealed by diagnostic self-testing of the portion of 
failures detected by a diagnostic called Detected Danger-
ous (DD) failures with a dangerous detected failure rate 
λDD; the diagnostic testing is assumed to be carried out 
frequently enough for the failures to be revealed imme-
diately. In subsystems with redundant elements, a failure 
may sometimes be repaired while the subsystem is on-
line and can perform its safety function. In other cases, 
the subsystem must taken off-line to repair the failure; the 
mean downtime of the subsystem to repair the failure of 
an item in the subsystem that has been revealed by diag-
nostic self-testing is known as mean time to restoration 
(MTTR). The remaining portion of dangerous failure rate 
is considered as undetected dangerous (UD) failure rate  , 
λDU which is supposed to be revealed by a periodic manual 
proof test with test interval t1. When a failure is detected 
by manual proof test, the subsystem has to be taken offline 
to be repaired with the mean repair time MRT.
Thus, the dangerous failure rate λD is the sum of the 
undetected failure rate λDU revealed by a periodic manual 
test with test interval t1 and mean repair time MRT in ad-
dition to detected failure rate λDD revealed by diagnostic 
self-testing with mean time to restoration MTTR,
λD=λDD+λDU
[4] (2)
DC is the measure of the effectiveness of the self-diag-
nostic test expressed by the fraction of dangerous failures 
detected by self-dangerous to total dangerous failures, 
DC = ∑
∑
λ
λ
DD
D
[4, 6]
λDD=DCλD (3)
λDU=(1-DC)λD (4)
From Eqs. 2, 3 and 4 in Eq.1;
 (5)
Step 3: Incorporating CCF into the formula 
An additional PFD arises where more failures may oc-
cur due to a common cause (CC). Thus, the total danger-
ous failure rate equals the sum of independent dangerous 
failure rate in addition to the common cause failure rate;
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/ese.v1i1.994
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 λD = λInd,D+ λCC 
[24,25,26].       (6)
Where: 
λInd,D is the independent dangerous failure rate, and 
λCC is the common cause failure rate.
The fractional of CCF rate is defined by the beta factor 
(β),
β = λCC/ λD                      (7)
The β factor provides the fraction of undetected dan-
gerous failures with a CC while the βD provides the frac-
tion of detected dangerous failures that have a CC; thus:
PFDKooN-total = (1-β) PFDKooN +β PFD1oo1  [22] (8)
From eqs. 6, 7 and 8 in Eq. 5;
 (9)
Step 4: Incorporating the PTC factor into the formula.
In Eq. 9, the proof test was considered to be perfect 
for revealing all undetected dangerous failures with the 
device being regarded new in condition at the end of the 
test interval. However, practically, the proof test can never 
be perfect as it depends on the quality of the procedure(s), 
errors committed by the maintenance crew during the test, 
test equipment quality, some inherent conditions for the 
tests, and the inherent features of the system itself. More-
over, device condition can be considered as a new condi-
tion only when major maintenance overhaul has been car-
ried out or when a demand is made at demand period t2. 
PTC is the percentage effectiveness of proof tests to check 
the existence of undetected danger failures expressed by 
the fraction of revealed failures during proof test to the 
non-revealed failures during proof test 
 (10)
 [27, 28, 29, 30, 31,32](11)
From eqs. 10 and 11 in Eq. 9;
 (12)
Step 5: Incorporating PST for the final control element
PST for final elements has the advantage of reducing 
the frequency of full tests to save deferment; thus, now 
there are two test intervals:
(1) More frequently performed partial closure test (Par-
tial Stroke test) at tPST 
Where tPST= t1 /m and m is the number of partial test 
intervals per full test interval with lower efficiency than 
FPT (Low coverage factor PST).
(2) Less frequent full test period (t1= tPST*m) with high-
er efficiency than partial test (high coverage factor PTC.
 (13)
From Eq. 13 in Eq. 12:
 (14)
In Eq. 14, failures detected by PST are considered as 
dangerous undetected failures, knowing that the sum of the 
test interval and the time to perform the repair of a detected 
failure is more than the mean time to restoration (MTTR) 
used to determine the achieved safety integrity for that safe-
ty function. Thus, PST does not affect SFF and consequent-
ly, it does not affect the architecture constrains.
The final formula to be modelled using GA is the total 
system probability of failure on demand expressed by the 
sum of the probability of failure on demand for the three 
subsystems (sensor, logic solver, and final control element).
PFDsys = PFDs + PFDLS + PFDFE  
 [4] (15)
Step 6: Modelling the formula using the GA technique
The target of modelling the formula using GA is to find 
the best value for variables of PFD developed formula 
achieving target PFD, satisfying design constraints, and 
reflecting industrial realities;
Figure 4. GA Model flowchart
GA uses populations with allowed solutions called ‘in-
dividuals’ that count in the group of parallel algorithms 
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with constrains, implying that it is necessary to set lim-
its at least for the values of the optimized parameters as 
shown in Figure 4.
Here, we use the MATLAB GA Toolbox for simulation, 
where the first step is to define the cost function, the next 
step is to encode the problem into suitable GA chromo-
somes, and then construct the population; some works rec-
ommend 20 to 100 chromosomes in one population since a 
higher number of chromosomes will give a better chance to 
find optimal results. However, due to execution time lim-
itation, 80 chromosomes are used for each generation; each 
chromosome comprises the model parameters with varied 
value bounds depending on the cost functions. The popula-
tion in each generation is represented by the 80 x 31 matrix, 
with the initial values of parameters as follows:
N L = 3 ;  K L = 1 ;  T P P T L S = 1 4 6 0 ;  M L S = 6 ; 
L L S = 1 0 ;  M T T R L S = 8 ;  C P T L S = 0 . 8 ;  N V = 3 ; 
KV=1; TPPTV=356; MV=6; LV=10; MTTRV=8; 
CPTV=1; CPPTV=0.7; NS1=2; KS1=1; TPPTSN-
SR1=514;MSNSR1=6; LSNSR1=10; MTTRSN-
SR1=8; CPTSNSR1=0.8;NS2=2;KS2=1; TPPTSN-
SR2=730;MSNSR2=6; LSNSR2=10; MTTRSNSR2=8; 
CPTSNSR2=0.8.
Each row is one chromosome that comprises the pa-
rameter values, and the last column is added to accommo-
date fitness values (F) of corresponding chromosomes; the 
final values of parameters are determined by minimizing a 
certain cost function.
The cost function (CF1) as shown in Eq. (16) minimiz-
es the integrated square error e(t) and improves the overall 
performance. 
CF e t dt1 = ∫0
∞
( ( ))2  (16)
Figures 5A and 5B show the structure of the GA tuning 
system for cost function. It can be noted that the input for 
the GA tuning system is the error signal only, which is 
sometimes not enough to obtain good results.
Figure 5A. GA based optimization model using MATLAB
Figure 5B. GA based optimization model configuration 
on MATLAB
4. Model Implementation and Result Inter-
pretation for Practical Case Study from the 
Oil and Gas field.
The Mansoura Petroleum company/West Khelala Gas 
processing plant includes the test separator (V-304) shown 
in Figure 6 below, where V-304 is a horizontally mounted 
cylindrical and 2 phase; the gravity separation and size is 
300 BBL/D for liquids and 38 MMscfd for gas with a 9m3 
surge volume. The produced liquid from the test separator 
is discharged under level control, LIC-011 using LCV-011 
[36].
The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study Report [36] 
resulted from the HAZOP session prepared for the men-
tioned unit.
Figure 6. Test Separator P&ID (Model under study)   [38]
Further, HAZOP concluded that high-level and 
high-pressure parable hazards exist and a safely-instru-
mented function is required for protection with target SIL 
3 (10-4 ≤ PFDavg ≥10-3 ).
The initial designed SIFs is composed of three subsys-
tems: level transmitter (LT), pressure transmitter (PT), 
logic solver (LS), and emergency shutdown valve (ESDV). 
When high pressure or level hazards are detected by the 
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transmitter, the system should shut the supply source to 
the separator in order to prevent the event [37]. 
The structure of the system is shown in Figure 7 below. 
Each subsystem has a parall structure. The sensor layer is 
made up of two identical pressure and level transmitters 
structured in the 1oo2 architecture.
LS
LS
LS
LT
LT
PT
PT
Figure 7: case study initial SIS structure
The logic solver layer (LS) is structured in the 1oo3 
architecture and the shutdown valves are structured in the 
1oo3 architecture.
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the variables and correspond-
ing PFD on demand calculations using the conventional 
and developed formulas.
From Table 3:
(1) The determined system PFD and all subsystem 
PFDs are almost the same without taking PTC and PST 
into account.
(2) The determined system PFD and all subsystem 
PFDs derived from IEC are almost equal to results derived 
by the developed formula, as well as the resulting PFDs 
with PTC being higher than the PFDs without considering 
the non-perfectness of the proof tests. Moreover, ISA does 
not have the capability of considering the PTC variable.
(3) The derived formula is the only approach that can 
count for the PST. Further, PST could decrease the PFD 
again after increasing due to the PTC consideration.
4.1 Effect of GA:
Table 4 shows the PFD variables and corresponding PFD 
derived by the GA based model.
From Table 4:
(1) The GA optimization model tended to increase the 
PST variable for the final control element from 50% to 
60% with monthly interval, including what extended the 
FPT interval T1 from annual to two years and what de-
creased the cost, process disturbance, human error, and 
material degradation associated with manual full FPT.
(2) Increasing the MTTR from 8 Hrs to 48 Hrs ensures 
enough time and permeability for practical repair activi-
ties in case of failure detection.
(3) Decreasing the PTC from 80% to 60%, consequent-
ly decreases the associated test procedures and related 
activities, and the associated cost facilitates the implemen-
tation.
Table 2. Design and reliability data
Subsystem λD K N DC t1 t2 m
MRT
= MTTR Β βD % PTC % PST
PT 1.90E-06 1 2 51.1 4380 43800 N/A 8 0.1 0.05 80 N/A
LT 7.60E-06 1 2 10 4380 43800 N/A 8 0.1 0.05 80 N/A
LS 3.20E-08 1 3 81.25 8760 87600 N/A 8 0.1 0.05 80 N/A
FE 3.35E-06 1 3 25 4380 N/A 6 8 0.1 0.05 80 50
Table 3. Comparison between resulted PFD using conventional formulas and developed formula
PFD using IEC formula PFD using ISA formula PFD using developed formula
Without PTC With PTC With PST Without PTC With PTC With PST Without PTC With PTC With PST
2.09E-04 6.09E-04 N/A 2.09E-04 N/A N/A 2.09E-04 6.85E-04 6.85E-04
1.87E-03 6.13E-03 N/A 1.80E-03 N/A N/A 1.75E-03 6.12E-03 6.12E-03
2.68E-06 7.37E-06 N/A 2.66E-06 N/A N/A 2.64E-06 7.39E-06 2.64E-06
5.53E-04 1.55E-03 N/A 5.60E-04 N/A N/A 5.53E-04 1.55E-03 5.53E-04
5.56E-04 1.56E-03 N/A 5.63E-04 N/A N/A 5.56E-04 1.56E-03 3.30E-04
Table 4. Variables and corresponding PFD derived by the GA model
Subsystem λD K N % DC t1 t2 m
MRT
= MTTR Β βD % PTC % PST Target PFD PFD
PT 1.90E-06 1 2 51.1 8760 43800 N/A 48 0.1 0.05 0.6 N/A
5.60E-04 5.50E-04
LT 7.60E-06 1 2 10 8760 43800 N/A 48 0.1 0.05 0.6 N/A
LS 3.20E-08 1 3 81.25 17520 87600 N/A 48 0.1 0.05 0.6 N/A
FE 3.35E-06 1 3 25 8760 N/A 12 48 0.1 0.05 N/A 60
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(1) The credit of the GA’s ability to keep the PFD be-
low the target PFD with the above mentioned optimiza-
tion is due to the incorporated PST and its contribution to 
improve the PFD and generalized formula for any KooN 
with implementation practicality credit because of the 
PTC incorporation.
(2) The presented generalized analytical formula for 
PFD determination has the capability of assessing any 
KooN architecture; thus, it can be used in PFD where 
higher redundancy architectures need to be assessed.
(3) PFD is obtained using the presented formula (ex-
cluding PST) is 5.56E-03, which is very close to the 
values obtained using the conventional formula 5.63E-
04, as it could keep the system PFD below the target PFD 
despite the above improvement for PFD variables.
4.2 Effect of Generalizing the PFD Formula into 
KooN:
Table 5 and Figure 8 show the PFD values for the logic 
solver structured in 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 2oo3, 1oo3, 2oo4, 
2oo5, and 3oo5 system architectures with a variety of test 
intervals without CC.
From Table 5 and Figure 8:
(1) For 1oo1 system architecture, when the logic solver 
receives the initiation signal from the sensor, it de-ener-
gizes the final control element to trip with 2.64E-06 PFD 
when it is being tested annually.
(2) For the same test interval, 1oo2 is used, and only 
one of the two logic solvers set needed to initiate the SIF 
with 9.43E-10 PFD. Resultantly, a great drop occurred at 
the PFD. 
(3) For 2oo2, both logic solvers must initiate the SIF 
when it’s important to keep the plant running. Further, it 
was required to be sure of the event having occurred to 
initiate the SIF with 5.31E-05 PFD. A great change result-
ed in the PFD as it increased to the double again, due to 
which this architecture gave an advantage of keeping the 
plant running and ensured the occurrence of the event in 
order to trip. However, it increased the PFD.
(4) For 2oo3 (triple marginal redundancy), two log-
ic solvers out of the three set must initiate the SIF with 
2.83E-09 PFD. A great change resulted in the PFD as it 
decreased again. 
(5) 2oo3 architecture had an advantage over the 2oo2 
architecture for the resulting PFD to be much lower than 
the resulted PFD from 2oo2.
(6) However, the resulting PFD from 1oo2 architecture 
was lower than the resulting counterpart from 2oo3. Con-
trastingly, 2oo3 architecture had an advantage over the 
1oo2 architecture that kept the plant running and ensured 
the occurrence of the event in order to trip.
(7) The higher the redundant architecture, the lower the 
PFD. Therefore, when we decrease the PFD by increas-
ing the redundancy, the PFD examination is not available 
using the conventional PFD formulas. However, here, we 
could determine the PFD of 2oo4 (1.52E-13 PFD), 2oo5 
(8.17E-18 PFD), and 3oo5 (3.79E-13PFD) system archi-
tectures using the developed formula. 
(8) On the other hand, it can be noticed from the curves 
that for all system architectures, the PFD increases with 
the increase of test interval.
Table 5. Effect of generalizing PFD formula into KooN
T1 PFD 
(1oo1)
PFD 
(1oo2)
PFD 
(2oo2)
PFD 
(2oo3)
PFD 
(1oo3)
PFD
(2oo4)
PFD
(2oo5)
PFD
(3oo5)
Month-
ly
2.42E-
06
8.20E-
12
4.83E-
06
2.46E-
11
3.28E-
17
1.31E-
16
7.36E-
22
3.28E-
16
3 
months
6.74E-
06
6.16E-
11
1.35E-
05
1.85E-
10
6.47E-
16
2.59E-
15
3.68E-
20
6.47E-
15
6 
months
1.32E-
05
2.35E-
10
2.64E-
05
7.05E-
10
4.75E-
15
1.90E-
14
5.17E-
19
4.75E-
14
1 year 2.65E-
05
9.43E-
10
5.31E-
05
2.83E-
09
3.79E-
14
1.52E-
13
8.17E-
18
3.79E-
13
2 years 5.28E-
05
3.73E-
09
1.06E-
04
1.12E-
08
2.97E-
13
1.19E-
12
1.26E-
16
2.97E-
12
3 years 7.91E-
05
8.36E-
09
1.58E-
04
2.51E-
08
9.94E-
13
3.98E-
12
6.32E-
16
9.94E-
12
4 years 1.05E-
04
1.48E-
08
2.11E-
04
4.45E-
08
2.35E-
12
9.39E-
12
1.99E-
15
2.35E-
11
5 years 1.32E-
04
2.31E-
08
2.63E-
04
6.94E-
08
4.58E-
12
1.83E-
11
4.84E-
15
4.58E-
11
6 years 1.58E-
04
3.33E-
08
3.16E-
04
9.99E-
08
7.90E-
12
3.16E-
11
1.00E-
14
7.90E-
11
7 years 1.84E-
04
4.53E-
08
3.68E-
04
1.36E-
07
1.25E-
11
5.01E-
11
1.85E-
14
1.25E-
10
8 years 2.10E-
04
5.91E-
08
4.21E-
04
1.77E-
07
1.87E-
11
7.48E-
11
3.15E-
14
1.87E-
10
9 years 2.37E-
04
7.48E-
08
4.74E-
04
2.24E-
07
2.66E-
11
1.06E-
10
5.05E-
14
2.66E-
10
10 
years
2.63E-
04
9.23E-
08
5.26E-
04
2.77E-
07
3.65E-
11
1.46E-
10
7.68E-
14
3.65E-
10
(a)
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(b)
(c)
Figure 8. Effect of generalizing PFD formula into KooN 
on PFD.
Figure 8 (a). no fault tolerance; Figure 8 (b). one fault tolerance; Figure 
8 (c). two fault tolerance
4.3 The Effect of Incorporating PTC into the For-
mula
Table 6 and Figure 9 show the impact of the PTC variable 
on the system PFD and each subsystem PFD.
In Table 6 and Figure 9, when the PTC increases, the 
PFD decreases while increasing the PTC improves safety 
by reducing PFD value. However, this consumes time, ef-
fort, and money as sticking seals during the full proof test 
(FPT) is relatively high since it requires flow bypasses, 
capital, and installation costs.
Table 6. Impact of PTC variable on system PFD and Sub-
systems PFDs
%PTC Logic solver PFD
Pressure 
sensor PFD
Level sen-
sor PFD
Final 
Control 
Element 
PFD
System 
PFD
100 2.64E-06 2.09E-04 1.75E-03 5.53E-04 5.56E-04
90 5.01E-06 4.04E-04 3.73E-03 1.05E-03 1.06E-03
80 7.37E-06 6.06E-04 6.11E-03 1.55E-03 1.56E-03
70 9.74E-06 8.16E-04 8.88E-03 2.05E-03 2.07E-03
60 1.21E-05 1.03E-03 1.20E-02 2.56E-03 2.58E-03
50 1.45E-05 1.26E-03 1.56E-02 3.07E-03 3.10E-03
40 1.68E-05 1.49E-03 1.95E-02 3.59E-03 3.63E-03
30 1.92E-05 1.73E-03 2.39E-02 4.11E-03 4.17E-03
20 2.16E-05 1.97E-03 2.86E-02 4.65E-03 4.73E-03
10 2.39E-05 2.22E-03 3.37E-02 5.19E-03 5.29E-03
0 2.63E-05 2.48E-03 3.92E-02 5.75E-03 5.87E-03
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Figure 9. The impact of the PTC variable on system PFD 
and subsystems PFD
From Table 7 and Figure 10, the behaviour of the 
curves shows the system PFD with variety test intervals 
demonstrated through 80% PTC system PFD, which is 
higher than the system PFD with perfect proof test as-
sumption. However, it reflects the industrial reality and 
must be considered due to the dependency on the quality 
of the procedure(s), errors committed by the maintenance 
crew during the test or repairs required, test equipment 
quality, some inherent conditions for the tests, and inher-
ent features of the system itself.
Table 7. System PFD with 80% PTC to system PFD with 
perfect proof test assumption
T1 System PFD With Per-fect proof test
System PFD with 80% 
PTC
6 months 5.55E-04 1.56E-03
1 Year 1.11E-03 3.15E-03
2 years 2.23E-03 6.66E-03
3 years 3.39E-03 1.09E-02
4 years 4.59E-03 1.61E-02
5 years 5.86E-03 2.29E-02
6 years 7.20E-03 3.16E-02
7 years 8.65E-03 4.27E-02
8 years 1.02E-02 5.66E-02
9 years 1.19E-02 7.39E-02
10 years 1.37E-02 9.50E-02
Figure 10. System PFD with 80% PTC to system PFD 
with perfect proof test assumption.alue
4.4 The Impact of Incorporating PST Into the 
Formula
Table 8 and Figure 11 show the effect of PST on the sys-
tem PFD and the final control element PFD.
Further, Table 9 and Figure 12 show the effect of the 
number of partial stroke tests m on the system PFD and 
the final control element PFD.
From tables 8 and 9 as well as figures 11 and 12, when 
the PST increases, the PFD decreases. The incorporation 
of PST into the formula for the final element only reason-
ably decreased the PFD as well as increased the PST and/
or decreased the partial test interval m, which can achieve 
further reduction of PFD.
Table 8. The impact of PST variable on system PFD and 
The final control element PFD
%PST Final Control Element PFD System PFD
0 5.53E-04 5.64E-04
10 5.07E-04 5.18E-04
20 4.66E-04 4.77E-04
30 4.15E-04 4.26E-04
40 3.69E-04 3.80E-04
50 3.23E-04 3.34E-04
60 2.77E-04 2.89E-04
70 2.36E-04 2.47E-04
80 1.97E-04 2.09E-04
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Figure 11. The impact of the PST variable on system PFD 
and the final control element PFD
Table 9. The impact of partial stroke tests number on 
system PFD and on Final control element PFD
M Final Control Element PFD System PFD
10 1.56E-04 1.67E-04
9 1.61E-04 1.72E-04
8 1.67E-04 1.78E-04
7 1.75E-04 1.86E-04
6 1.86E-04 1.97E-04
5 2.00E-04 2.12E-04
4 2.22E-04 2.34E-04
3 2.59E-04 2.70E-04
2 3.33E-04 3.44E-04
1 5.53E-04 5.64E-04
Figure 12. The impact of the m variable on system PFD 
and the final control element PFD.alue
Table 10 and Figure 13 show the system PFD curve 
without partial stroke testing and PFD curve for the sys-
tem when 80% effective partial stroke tests were applied 6 
times per full test interval.
Table 10. System PFD with 80% PST and 6 M to system 
versus PFD without partial stroke testing
T1 System PFD without PST
System PFD with 80% 
PST & 6M
6 months 1.56E-03 1.97E-04
1 year 3.15E-03 3.80E-04
2 years 6.66E-03 7.48E-04
3 years 1.09E-02 1.12E-03
4 years 1.61E-02 1.49E-03
5 years 2.29E-02 1.86E-03
6 years 3.16E-02 2.23E-03
7 years 4.27E-02 2.61E-03
8 years 5.66E-02 2.99E-03
9 years 7.39E-02 3.37E-03
10 years 9.50E-02 1.97E-04
Figure 13. system PFD with 80% PST and 6 M to system 
PFD without partial stroke testing
From Table 10 and Figure 13, the system PFD was rea-
sonably reduced when partial stroke tests were applied for 
the final control element with 80% PST 6 times per full 
test interval. Thus, the system safety increased and cost 
reduced as well due to the extension of the full proof test 
interval.
5. Conclusion
The proposed model in this paper can assess any KooN 
architecture, which is not limited to (1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 
2oo3, 1oo3, and 2oo4) architectures contributing to reduce 
the model uncertainty. Moreover, all known terms that in-
fluence the PFD values have been included, investigated, 
and explained; the presented formula has the capability 
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of determining PFD for SIS operating in the low demand 
mode such that it is used in the oil and gas industry but 
not capable of the same task at a high complexity time, 
which is dependent on safety systems. Moreover, the 
presented PFD formula provides a wider interpretation of 
systems with non-perfect proof tests, as the results showed 
reasonable reduction in PFD with the increase of PTC 
and/or test frequency. Further, incorporating PST into the 
PFD formula for the final control element improves safe-
ty by reducing the PFD value since part of DU failures 
detected and repaired within a shorter time interval than 
the full test interval. In addition, increasing the PST and/
or decreasing the stroke test interval can achieve further 
reduction in PFD. Moreover, cost is reduced by extend-
ing the full test interval; sticking seals during PST are 
less than those during FPT, thereby decreasing full flow 
bypasses and reducing engineering, capital, and installa-
tion costs. Consequently, the failures detected by PST are 
considered as dangerous undetected failures, knowing that 
practically, t1+MRT of a detected failure cannot be elim-
inated to few minutes or hours may exceed MTTR used 
to determine the achieved safety integrity for that safety 
function. Therefore, PST does not affect SFF and conse-
quently, it does not affect the architecture constrains as it 
also contributes to reducing the completeness uncertainty.
The presented PFD formula has been incorporated into 
the GA model for formulating optimal design of SIS in or-
der to achieve the required RRF. The efficiency has been 
realized numerically in the practical case study. Moreover, 
it saved effort, time and cost and facilitated assessing sys-
tems with higher complexity that contributed to reducing 
the model uncertainty.
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Abbreviations
CCF:  Common Cause Failures
FCE:  Final Control Element
GA:   Genetic Algorithm
HAZOP: Hazard and Operability Study
IEC  International Electrotechnical Commission 
ISA  The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation 
Society 
LS:  Logic Solver
LT:  Level Transmitter
PFD:  Probability of Failure on Demand 
PT:  Pressure Transmitter
PST:  Partial Stroke Testing
RRF:  Risk Reduction Factor 
SIF:  Safety Instrumented Function
SIL:  Safety Integrity Level
SIS:  Safety Instrumented System 
Symbols
λD: Dangerous Failure Rate (Per Hr)
λDD: Detected Dangerous Failure Rate (Per Hr)
λDU: Undetected Dangerous Failure Rate (Per Hr)
λCC: Common Cause Failure Rate (Per Hr)
β : Undetected Failures Common Cause Factor
βD : Detected Failures Common Cause Factor
DC:   Diagnostic Coverage Factor
K: Number needed to initiate the trip
N: Number of channels/equipment sets
m:  Number of Partial Stroke Tests Per Full Proof 
Test Internal
MRT:  Mean Repair Time (Hrs)
MTTR:  Mean Time to Restoration (Hrs)
t1: Proof Test Interval (Hrs) 
t2: Intervals Between Demands (Hrs) 
PTS: Partial Stroke Test Coverage Factor
PTC:  Proof Test Coverage
References 
[1] Health and Safety Executive, The Flixborough di-
saster: report of the court of inquiry, HMSO, ISBN 
0113610750, 1975.
[2] F. Lees, Hazard identification, assessment and con-
trol, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 3:3, 
Butterworth Heinemann, ISBN 0 7506 1547 8, 1996.
[3] W. Cullen, The public inquiry into the piper alpha 
disaster, HMSO, London, 1990.
[4] IEC Standard 61508 Standard, Edition 2, Functional 
safety of electrical / electronic / programmable elec-
tronic safety related systems, 2010. 
[5] IEC 61511 Standard, Edition 2, Functional safe-
ty-safety instrumented systems for the process indus-
try sector, 2010.
[6] ISA-TR.84.00.02, Application of safety instrumented 
systems for the process control industry”, Instrumen-
tation Society of America, (ISA), 2002. 
[7] H. Jin, M. Lundteigen, and M. Rausand, Uncertainty 
assessment of reliability estimates for safety-instru-
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/ese.v1i1.994
14
Electrical Science & Engineering | Volume 01 | Issue 02 | October 2019
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
mented systems, Proc IMechE Part O, J Risk and 
Reliability, Ó IMechE, 2012, 226(6): 646–655. 
[8] L. Oliveira and R. Abramovitch, Extension of ISA 
TR84.00.02 PFD equations to KooN architectures, 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2010, 95 
(7): 707–715. 
[9] M. Abdelrhafour, N. Bajaj and S. Boil, Proof test 
procedure effectiveness on safety instrumented sys-
tems, 2013.
[10] J. Börcsök, P. Holub, M. Schwarz et al. Probability 
of failure on demand for systems with partial stroke 
test, International Journal of Mathematical Models 
and Methods in Applied Science, 2007, 1(4).
[11] R. Freeman and A. Summers, Evaluation of uncer-
tainty in safety integrity level calculations, American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Safety Prog-
ress, 2016, 35(4).
[12] Sh. Wu, L. Laibin, M. Lundteigen, W. Zheng. Re-
liability assessment for final elements of SISs with 
time dependent failures. Journal of Loss Prevention 
in the Process Industries, 2018, 51.
[13] H. EL-Sayed. Will a partial valve stroke testing lead 
to a higher SIL?. Hazardex, Conference and Exhibi-
tion, Runcorn, Cheshire UK, 2016.
[14] H. Khan. Generalizing PFD formulas of IEC 61508 
for KooN configurations. ISA Transactions, 2016, 
55: 168-174.
[15] L. Oliveira and R. Abramovitch, Extension of ISA 
TR84.00.02 PFD equations to KooN architectures. 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2010, 95 
(7): 707–715. 
[16] M. Chebila, and F. Innal, Generalized analytical 
expressions for safety instrumented systems perfor-
mance measures Pfd avg and pfh. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 2015, 34:167–
176.
[17] W. Martins, Methods for determining pfd/sil for 
workover control systems with short test-intervals 
and imperfect testing. 2014.
[18] E. Naresh Ocheni, Impact of partial and imperfect 
testing on reliability assessment of safety instrument-
ed systems, 2015.
[19] T. Gabriel, A Hildebrandt, and U menck. PFD calcu-
lation considering Imperfect Proof Tests. Chemical 
Engineering transactions, 2016, 48.
[20] L. Stewart. Are your safety instrumented systems 
proof tests effective?. EXIDA-Valve Magazine, 2017.
[21] D. Hermawanto. Genetic algorithm for solving sim-
ple mathematical equality problem. Book, Chapter 2, 
Budapest, 2013.
[22] M. Rausand, Reliability of safety-critical systems: 
theory and applications, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ. 2014.
[23] M. Rausand and A. Hsyland, System reliability theo-
ry, models, statistical methods, and application, Sec-
ond Edition, 2004.
[24] H. Jin and M. Rausand. Reliability of safety-instru-
mented systems subject to partial testing and com-
mon-cause failures. Reliability Engineering & Sys-
tem Safety, 2014, 121: 146–151.
[25] M. Lundteigen, M. Rausand, Common cause failures 
in safety instrumented systems on oil and gas in-
stallations: implementing defense measures through 
function testing. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, 2007, 20: 218–229.
[26] W. Mechri, C Simon, and K. Othman. Uncertainty 
analysis of common cause failure in safety instru-
mented systems. Proc. IMechE, part O: J. Risk and 
Reliability, 2010, 225. 
[27] D. Fournier. How critical is proof test coverage?: 
functional safety clarified. Canadian Process Equip-
ment & Control News, 2009.
[28] E. Naresh Ocheni, Impact of partial and imperfect 
testing on reliability assessment of safety instrument-
ed systems, 2015.
[29] F. Brissaud, A. Barros, and C. Bérenguer. Probability 
of failure on demand of safety systems: impact of 
partial test distribution. Journal of Risk and Reliabili-
ty, 1748006X12448142, 2012.
[30] F.Innal, Y. Liu, M. Lundteigen, et al.. Pfdavg and pfh 
formulas for sis subject to partial and full periodic 
tests. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2015. 
[31] S. Sachdeva, Imperfect testing and its influence on 
availability of safety instrumented systems, 2015.
[32] W. Martins. Methods for determining pfd/sil for 
workover control systems with short test-intervals 
and imperfect testing, 2014.
[33] A. E. Summers and B. Zachary. Partial stroke testing 
of block valves. Control Engineering, 2006, 47(12): 
87–89. 
[34] M. Lundteigen and M. Rausand. Partial stroke testing 
of process shutdown valves: How to determine the 
test coverage. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Pro-
cess Industries, 2008: 579–588.
[35] M. Lundteigen and M. Rausand. The effect of partial 
stroke testing on the reliability of safety valves. Reli-
ability and Societal Safety, Proceedings of the Euro-
pean Safety and Reliability Conference, 2007.
[36] Mansoura Petroleum Company, Inst.-Doc No. 4607-
815-10-RT-002. Engineering works for west khelala 
plant, hazop report, 2016.
[37] Mansoura Petroleum Company, Inst.-Doc No. 
4607-815-KCB-001Rev.0, C&E.
[38] Mansoura Petroleum Company, Inst.-Doc No. 
4607-815-KKB-01/2/3/4/5/6-Rev.1, P&IDs.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/ese.v1i1.994
